FMEA and FTA Analyses of the Adhesive Joining Process using Electrically Conductive Adhesives by Povolotskaya, E. & Mach, P.
Acta Polytechnica Vol. 52 No. 2/2012
FMEA and FTA Analyses of the Adhesive Joining Process using
Electrically Conductive Adhesives
E. Povolotskaya, P. Mach
Abstract
This paper introduces a formulation of appropriate risk estimation methods that can be used for improving of processes
in the electronics area. Two risk assessment methods have been chosen with regard to the speciﬁcs of adhesive joining
based on electrically conductive adhesives. The paper provides a combination of a failure mode and eﬀect analysis
(FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA) for optimizing of the joining process. Typical features and failures of the process
are identiﬁed. Critical operations are found and actions for avoiding failures in these actions are proposed. A fault tree
has been applied to the process in order to get more precise information about the steps and operations in the process,
and the relations between these operations. The fault tree identiﬁes potential failures of the process. Then the eﬀects of
the failures have been estimated by the failure mode and eﬀect analysis method. All major diﬀerences between failure
mode and eﬀect analysis and fault tree analysis are deﬁned and there is a discussion about how to use the two techniques
complement each other and achieve more eﬃcient results.
Keywords: failure mode and eﬀect analysis, fault tree analysis, adhesive joining, electrically conductive adhesives.
1 Introduction
Electrically conductive adhesives (ECAs) are becom-
ing increasingly important in the electronics indus-
try. These materials are used in two main areas of
electronics packaging – in mounting of heat sensitive
components such as LCDs, and in mounting ultra-
ﬁne pitch electronic packages [1].
ECAs create a permanent electrical and mechan-
ical connection between the pad and the component
lead. Adhesives on an epoxy basis ﬁlled with sil-
ver conductive particles are mainly used. The curing
temperature is lower than the soldering temperature
of lead-free solders. The electrical conductivity de-
pends on the concentration of conductive particles
in the resin, on the shape and the material of these
particles [2].
An appropriate surface pretreatment of the joined
parts and detailed control of the ﬁller through an
analysis of the grains are necessary to achieve of good
electrical, mechanical and thermal properties of adhe-
sive joints [3]. To achieve parameters adhesive joints
that are comparable with soldered joints it is neces-
sary to optimize the process of adhesive joining.
The electrical resistivity of adhesives, electrical
noise and the nonlinearity of the current vs. volt-
age characteristic are higher than these parameters
for lead-free solders. The mechanical properties and
climate resistivity of ECAs are also worse than these
of solders [4].
There are many parameters that inﬂuence the
quality of adhesive joints in the process of adhesive
joining. Optimization of this process requires the use
of proper quality control tools such as failure mode
and eﬀect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis
(FTA). These analyses make an examination of the
process critical parameters possible.
FMEA is a technique for analyzing the occur-
rence of process failures and their eﬀect on the re-
sult of a process [7]. Currently, FMEA is a widely
used method for risk assessment in industrial pro-
cesses. This method is primarily adapted for ma-
terial and equipment failures. There are four basic
types of FMEA: process FMEA, system FMEA, de-
sign FMEA and service FMEA. FMEA produces risk
priority numbers (RPNs) as outcomes. RPNs are ob-
tained for each failure that can occur in a process.
An RPN is a multiplication of the severity, occur-
rence and detection numbers for each failure. Sever-
ity of failure shows the level of seriousness of the fail-
ure. The occurrence number represents how often the
failure occurs and the detection number indicates the
level of visibility of the failure. The purpose of FMEA
is to reduce the RPN by reducing one, two or all three
numbers in order to improve the process and ensure
the non-appearance of such errors subsequently. The
appearance of the failure can be reduced by improv-
ing the technical documentation requirements in the
process to eliminate the causes of failures or reduce
their frequency. Detection can be reduced by oﬀering
new or improved assessment methods or by oﬀering
additional equipment for detection. Several examples
of FMEA implementation for industrial processes are
presented in [12–15].
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A fault treeforms the basis for logical-probabilis-
tic models of system failure causality, failures of its el-
ements and other events or impacts [8]. This method
is based on sequences and combinations of distur-
bances and faults [9]. Thus it is a multilevel structure
or diagram of causal relationships [10]. FTA provides
a common vision of the process, components, and
how these components are related. This makes it easy
to identify the defects arising in the process. It also
provides a way for proposing step-by-step improve-
ments to prevent defects and errors and for making
a troubleproof process. Several examples of a suc-
cessful combination of fault tree analysis and failure
mode and eﬀect analysis methods for application in
industrial processes are shown in [10, 16–19].
This paper presents the use of FTA and FMEA
for optimizing the joining process when electrically
conductive adhesives (ECA) are used.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Basic risk analysis methods
Generally, risk is the possibility of the occurrence of
certain undesirable events that initiate various types
of failures. Risk analysis is used to ﬁnd causes of fail-
ures and to prevent the occurrence of these failures
in the future. The results of risk analysis can be used
for process optimization.
Risk analysis is divided into two complementary
types:
1. Qualitative.
2. Quantitative.
The task of qualitative analysis is to identify the
risk areas in a process, types of risks, and the factors
causing the risks. This is done in various ways, for
example, by an expert, by brainstorming and so on.
Quantitative analysis enables the level of eﬀect to be
quantiﬁed for each type of risk.
Basic methods for risk analysis are as follows:
1. Analogies.
2. Expert methods.
3. Statistical methods.
4. Modeling, etc.
The analogy approach is focused on an examina-
tion of analogies among data obtained from a range of
sources. Expert methods are used to collect the opin-
ions of qualiﬁed specialists. A statistical approach to
risk analysis uses various types of statistical methods
to process data that has been obtained experimen-
tally. The simulation is based on calculating various
types of models and on testing or these models in
various situations.
The followings are some of the most commonly
used risk analysis methodologies [5]:
1. Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT).
2. Fault tree analysis (FTA).
3. Event tree analysis (ETA).
4. Failure modes and eﬀects analysis (FMEA).
Two expert methods for risk analysis — fault tree
analysis (FTA) and failure mode and eﬀect analysis
(FMEA) — were used for an analysis of a conductive
adhesive joining process [22].
2.2 Fault tree analysis
FTA is a very powerful systematic way which is
widely used for estimating process quality. Start-
ing from the top event, the fault-tree method uses
a Boolean algebra and logical modeling to make a
graphical representation of the relations among var-
ious failure events at diﬀerent levels of the process
(Figure 1) [21].
Fig. 1: Typical fault tree
In this technique, deductive logic is used. It en-
ables the root causes of the failure events of a process
to be found. This type of logic helps to establish a
clear and detailed scheme of relationships between
steps or events in the process that can aﬀect their
quality.
The contribution of the fault tree is as follows:
• Allows potential failure parts of the process to
be seen in detail.
• Helps identify failures deductively.
• Enables a qualitative or quantitative analysis of
the process to be made.
• The method can focus on individual parts of the
process, and can extract speciﬁc failures.
• It clearly represents the behavior of the process.
The main advantage of the fault tree (in compari-
son with other methods) is that the analysis is limited
to identifying only those events of the process which
lead to a speciﬁc process failure.
The disadvantages of fault trees are as follows:
• Implementation of the method requires consid-
erable inputs, because more process details leads
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to a geometric increase in the analyzed area, and
the number of inﬂuencing events grows corre-
spondingly.
• A fault tree is a Boolean logic diagram, which
shows only two states: working and failed.
• It is diﬃcult to estimate the state of partial
failure of the process parts, because use of the
method generally indicates that the process is
either in good condition or in a faulty state.
• It requires a reliability specialist with deep
knowledge of the process.
2.3 Failure mode and eﬀect analysis
The FMEA method is applied in addition to the FTA
technique. The Failure Mode and Eﬀects Analysis
(FMEA) is a widely used analytical tool. It is espe-
cially useful in connection with reliability, maintain-
ability and safety analyses.
The main goals of the technique are to determine:
• Possible failures (defects) of the process, their
causes and consequences;
• The criticality of the eﬀects on the process (S),
the probability of occurrence (defects) (O) and
their detectability (D).
• Generalized assessments of the functionality of
the process — calculation of RPN. Ten-point or
ﬁve-point rating scales are often used for occur-
rence, detection and severity numbers. A rule of
thumb is usually used for the risk priority num-
ber. This means that a serious look has to be
taken at RPNs higher than 125. When a ten-
point scale is used [3].
A special team is set up to conduct FMEA. The
values of S, D, O, and RPN are determined by expert
estimates [22].
FMEA of the production process covers the stage
of technical preparation of equipment and materials
for the process to be started. It ends before the direct
work begins [22].
3 Experimental part
Before the risk analysis is started, it is necessary to
deﬁne the main steps in the process. A ﬂow-chart of
the process of electrically conductive adhesive joining
is shown in Figure 2.
Failures of adhesive joints are mostly connected
with their mechanical and/or electrical properties. A
table of failure resistance and nonlinearity of the cur-
rent vs. the voltage characteristic of an adhesive joint
is shown in Table 1. The structure of the total resis-
tance of an adhesive joint is shown in Figure 3.
Here R1 represents the resistances between the
component lead and the adhesive, R2 represents the
resistance of adhesive, and R3 represents the resis-
tance between the pad and the adhesive.
Fig. 2: Flow-chart for a joining process based on ECA
Fig. 3: Total resistance of an adhesive joint
Table 1: Adhesive joining characteristics (the values are
valid for joining components of dimension type 1206)
Typical value Failure value
Resistance (R) 20mΩ ≥ 40mΩ
Nonlinearity(U) 10μV ≥ 25μV
Parts of the assembly process which inﬂuence the
values of these resistances are examined and analyzed
for the risk of the occurrence of potential failures.
Deductive approach (FTA) and inductive ap-
proach (FMEA) are reviewed.
The ﬁrst step in the process of an examination
of adhesive joining using a fault tree analysis is to
identify the main undesirable events. To deﬁne such
an event, it is necessary to deﬁne still acceptable
values for joint resistance, nonlinearity of the cur-
rent vs. voltage characteristic of the joint, shear
strength, tensile strength, etc. Typical and failure
values of electrical adhesive joining characteristics,
such as joint resistance and joint nonlinearity of the
current vs. voltage characteristic, are shown in Ta-
ble 1.
These events become the top-event of a fault tree.
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Table 2: Inﬂuence of basic fault events on the properties of the adhesive
FAULTY ECA JOINT
Low
mechanical
resistivity
High
electrical
resistance
High
nonlinearity
of adhesive
High
noise
FTA code
Improper material of a lead × × FCU1
Improper material of a pad × FCU2
Improper surface ﬁnish of a lead × × × FCU3
Improper surface ﬁnish of a pad × × × × FCU4
Inappropriate curing × × × FCU5
Inappropriate storing × × FCU6
Inappropriate type of resin × × FCU7
Inappropriate concentration of ﬁller particles × × × FCU8
Inappropriate viscosity × × × FCU9
Fig. 4: FTA for joints formed by ECA
The second step is to identify of events directly
related to the top-event. This is a repeatable process
and can be continued until we reach the basic events
that cause the top-event. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is
generally performed using a logical structure of AND
and OR gates. In the case of the joining process based
on electrically conductive adhesive (ECA), each ba-
sic faulty event, alone, can cause one or more failures
of an adhesive joint, so instead of grouping them un-
der gates, we used a tabular representation of FTA
(Table 2).
As a result of applying the FTA method to adhe-
sive joining we found the weakest parts of the pro-
cess. To obtain a better understanding of the failures,
we applied FTA to each type of typical joint failure.
Fault trees are presented in Figures 4, 5 and 6.
Variance of the electrical resistance sometimes ap-
pears in joint of this type. It can be caused by im-
proper surface ﬁnish of the pad and the component
lead by faulty placing of a component or by using an
adhesive with faulty consistency. Figure 7 shows a
more detailed representation of the joint.
When the FTA has been performed, an induc-
tive method such as failure mode and eﬀect analysis
(FMEA) is applied to the joining process in order to
analyze the signiﬁcance of various types of failures.
With the help of FMEA, a potential failure mode in
the process is analyzed to deﬁne the eﬀect on the
result of the process and to classify each potential
failure mode according to severity. In the process
considered here, we used Process FMEA in an origi-
nal functional approach [20].
In this approach, each step in the process per-
forms a number of events which can be determined
as outputs. The outputs are listed and analyzed.
Fig. 5: FTA for joints formed by ECA
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Fig. 6: FTA for joints formed by ECA
Fig. 7: FTA for joints formed by ECA
In our approach, we used the list of failures, i.e.
events which cause the top-event, deﬁned during the
FTA analysis and for each undesirable event we de-
ﬁne:
• Basic causes of failures,
• Speciﬁc features of the process,
• Severity numbers of failures(S): an assessment of
the seriousness of the eﬀects on the failure pro-
cess,
• Number of occurrences of failures (O): an as-
sessment of the likelihood that a failure will oc-
cur,
• Detection number of failures (D): assessment
of whether current control methods detect the
causes of failures on an appropriate level,
• Risk priority numbers (RPN): multiplication
of detection, occurrence and severity numbers.
This is used to set priorities for failures on pro-
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Table 3: Part of the failure mode and eﬀect analysis table for joints formed by ECA
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cess levels, and to establish what requires addi-
tional quality planning,
• Corrective actions,
• Checks on corrective actions.
Parts of the output of this analysis of the Faulty
ECA Joint failure mode are shown in Table 3.
4 Conclusion
The outcome of this approach is a reliability anal-
ysis realized through the interaction of the FMEA
and FTA reliability tools. Each of these risk analysis
methods has advantages, which enable the techno-
logical process to be investigated and help to observe
the process more clearly from diﬀerent points of view.
The FMEA method in general is a library of all possi-
ble potential failures and their consequences, whereas
FTA enables a detailed analysis of logical and tempo-
ral relationships that lead to a failure, taken over the
top of the tree. The application of these two methods
to the process, complementing each other, provides
deeper information than applying the methods sep-
arately. As a consequence of this approach, more
eﬃcient results have been achieved. The most sig-
niﬁcant steps in forming high-quality adhesive joints
are the preparation of the pad and the lead surfaces.
Preventive measures to avoid failures have been pro-
posed.
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